S. W. Energy Corporation v. Continental Insurance Company and Marine Office of America Corporation : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
S. W. Energy Corporation v. Continental Insurance
Company and Marine Office of America
Corporation : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert P Hill; John A. Adams; Ray, Quineey and Nebecker; Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Scott W. Christensen; Jaryl Rencher; Hanson, Epperson and Wallace; Counsel for Defendants/
Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, S. W. Energy Corporation v. Continental Insurance Company, No. 970520 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1042
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S.W. ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
and MARINE OFFICE OF AMERICA 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Counsel for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
Robert P. Hill 
John A. Adams 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 So. Main Street, Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Case no. 970520 
Priority (15) 
Counsel for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
Scott W. Christensen 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS, CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND MARINE 
OFFICE OF AMERICA CORP. ENTERED BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM 
A. THORNE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY 
l 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S.W. ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
and MARINE OFFICE OF AMERICA 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case no. 970520 
Priority (15) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS, CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND MARINE 
OFFICE OF AMERICA CORP. ENTERED BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM 
A. THORNE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY 
Counsel for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
Robert P. Hill 
John A. Adams 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 So. Main Street, Ste. 500 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Counsel for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
Scott W. Christensen 
Jaryl L. Rencher 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
l 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
LIST OF PARTIES ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The District Court properly granted Defendants 
Summary Judgment when the insurance policy in question 
was not ambiguous and the plain language of the exclusion 
did not cover the Plaintiff's loss of oil 
caused by corrosion 
2. Plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims were 
properly dismissed by the trial court as a matter 
law 
3. The supplemental affidavit of Richard P. Smoot 
and the declaration of Jim Pinneo (both proposed 
by the Plaintiff) were properly subject to a Motion 
to Strike. Utah R.Civ.P.56(e) only permits affidavits 
to be filed in support or opposition to a Motion for 
Summary Judgment which "set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence." 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS ANY DISPOSITION BELOW 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
ii 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
CNA SUMMARY JUDGMENT SINCE THE PLAIN AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY EXCLUSION 
DID NOT COVER THE PLAINTIFF'S LOSS OF OIL CAUSED 
BY CORROSION AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATED 
THAT THE TANK CORRODED 18 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS 18 
B. UNDER UTAH LAW, INSURANCE COMPANIES IN UTAH 
ARE TO BE INTERPRETED LIKE ORDINARY CONTRACTS 19 
C. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EXCLUSION DOES NOT 
COVER THE PLAINTIFF'S LOSS OF OIL CAUSED BY 
CORROSION 20 
D. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT THE TANK 
CORRODED EXCLUDING COVERAGE AS A MATTER OF 
LAW 24 
E. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT AND CITED CASE LAW FAIL 25 
POINT II. S.W. ENERGY'S BAD FAITH AND FRAUD CLAIMS 
PROPERLY FAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW 2 9 
A. BAD FAITH LAW 2 9 
1. INVESTIGATION ISSUE 3 0 
2 . FAIRLY DEBATABLE ISSUE 30 
B. PLAINTIFF'S CITED AUTHORITY DEFEATS CLAIMS 
OF BAD FAITH IN THIS CASE 31 
C. IF AN INSURER PREVAILS ON AN UNDERLYING 
CLAIM IT CANNOT AS A MATTER OF LAW HAVE ACTED 
IN BAD FAITH IN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH A 
POLICYHOLDER 3 3 
POINT III. THIS COURT SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT 
CNA'S MOTION TO STRIKE WAS EFFECTIVELY 
GRANTED AND IMPROPER TESTIMONY BY PLAINTIFF'S 
WITNESSES WAS INADMISSABLE 34 
111 
A. RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE PROHIBITED THE TRIAL COURT 
FROM CONSIDERING INADMISSABLE FACTUAL 
STATEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE 
UNSUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE FOUNDATION 34 
B. EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS SUFFICIENT 
FOUNDATION FOR THE AFFIDAVITS OR STATEMENTS 
THAT WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE MOTION TO STRIKE, 
THEIR EFFECT IS MOOT IN THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NOW 
ADMITTED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE TANK'S FAILURE 
WAS CORROSION 3 7 
C. IF THE AFFIDAVITS WERE IMPROPERLY STRICKEN, 
ALLOWING THE SAME WOULD MERELY CAUSE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM TO BE DENIED UNDER THE "WEAR AND TEAR" 
EXCLUSION 37 
CONCLUSION 38 
ADDENDUM 3 9 
A. MOAC Oil and Gas Lease Property Form. R. 157-158. 
B. ACORD Property Loss Notice, December 14, 1995. R. 159. 
C. Swett & Crawford Group, Notice of Claim, November 27, 1995. 
R. 160. 
D. Adjuster Contact Record, December 15, 1995, through June 5, 
1996. R. at 161-168. 
E. Double Tank estimate of costs insuring tank, CNA Insurance 
Companies correspondence regarding uninsurable event. R. 169-178. 
F. BLM Incident report to CNA. R. 179-182. 
G. CNA Declination of Claim, February 8, 1996. R. 183. 
H. Correspondence from S.W. Energy Corp's Counsel to CNA, 
April 10, 1996. R. 184-188. 
I. Report of Garrett Engineers, June 5, 1996. R. 189-200. 
J. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Judge 
William A. Thome, Civil No. 960905357, October 1, 1997. R. 266-
269. 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Arkwricfht-Boston Mf rs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wasau Paper Mills, 
818 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1986) 28 
Adams-Arapahoe Joint Venture School Dist. No. 28-J 
v. Continental Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1989) 28 
Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272 
(Utah 1993) 18, 21, 22, 23, 30 
Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F.Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977) 36 
Bartlett v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
538 A.2d 997 (Rhode Island 1988) 33 
Bettigole v. American Employers Ins. Co., 
567 N.E.2d. 1259 (Mass. App. 1991) 24, 28 
Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 
(Utah 1996) 18, 29, 30, 31 
Bodger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745 (Utah 1996) 2 
Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989) 2 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) 1 
First American Title Insurance Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 
34 3 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 7 (May 12, 1998, #96053 0) 19, 20 
Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990) 35 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 
(Utah 1992) 2 
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 802 P.2d 1071 
(Arizona App. 1990) 33, 34 
Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 
879 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App. 1994) 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33 
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 SW.2d 668 
(Texas App. 1993) 34 
v 
Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 
790 P. 2d 581 (Utah App. 1990) 18 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (j ) 1 
RULES 
Utah R. App .P.3 1 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56 34, 35 
Utah R.Civ.P.56(c) 1, 2 
Utah R.Civ.P.56(e) 2 
vi 
LIST OF PARTIES ON APPEAL 
The caption contains a list of all parties involved in this 
action below. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)and Utah R.App.P.3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The District Court properly granted Defendants Summary 
Judgment when the insurance policy in question was not ambiguous 
and the plain language of the exclusion did not cover the 
Plaintiff's loss of oil caused by corrosion. 
Standard of Review: Upon review of a grant of summary judgment, the 
Supreme Court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
trial court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). 
Utah R.Civ.P.56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate 
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
2. Plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims were properly 
dismissed by the trial court as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review: When the trial court concludes that the 
Defendant's denial of coverage was proper and is not subject to any 
claim for bad faith or fraudulent insurance acts, this Court should 
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apply that standard espoused by Utah R.Civ.P.56(c) as to whether 
any genuine issue of material fact exists, while implementing a 
correction of error standard as to legal questions. See generally 
Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242,244(Utah Ct.App. 
1989). 
3. The supplemental affidavit of Richard P. Smoot and the 
declaration of Jim Pinneo (both proposed by the Plaintiff) were 
properly subject to a Motion to Strike• Utah R.Civ.P.56(e) only 
permits affidavits to be filed in support or opposition to a Motion 
for Summary Judgment which "set forth such facts cis would be 
admissible in evidence." 
Standard of Review: "Affidavits of experts are insufficient to 
defeat summary judgment unless foundational facts are set forth 
submitting their opinions and conclusions." King v. Searle 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992), Bodger 
v.Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances 
or regulations that are determinative of the issues in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, 
Plaintiff, S.W. Energy Corporation, filed suit against 
Colonial Insurance Company and Marine Office of America Corporation 
(sometimes collectively referred to as "MOAC" or "CNA") to compel 
performance of CNA's alleged obligations under a contract of 
insurance and to recover damages and attorney fees as a result of 
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CNA's alleged breach of contract and alleged bad faith rejection of 
plaintiff's claim for coverage for the loss of plaintiff's oil due 
to corrosion of its holding tank. 
After conducting minimal discovery and after CNA filed a 
motion in support of a more definite statement (to which plaintiff 
never responded) plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment arguing -that the policy in question must be construed as 
a matter of law in plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff also argued that 
it was entitled to recover the value of the oil from CNA and 
asserted that CNA breached its duty of good faith under the policy, 
thus entitling plaintiff to recover its costs and attorney fees. 
In opposition, CNA filed a counter motion for summary 
judgment, successfully asserting that (a) the plain language of the 
exclusion did not cover the plaintiff's loss of oil caused by 
corrosion; (b) the undisputed facts demonstrated that the oil tank 
corroded excluding coverage as a matter of law; and, (c) 
plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims should be dismissed as a 
matter of law. 
B, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW, 
On August 1, 1996, S.W. Energy Corporation filed suit against 
CNA claiming breach of contract, breach of covenants of good faith 
and fair dealing, insurance fraud, conversion and breach of 
fiduciary duty for CNA's refusal to cover plaintiff's loss of oil 
caused by the corrosion of its holding tank. (Rl-9) CNA answered 
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plaintiff's Complaint asserting all appropriate affirmative 
defenses (R51-60) and within 60 days thereafter filed a motion for 
a more definite statement on plaintiff's allegations of fraud. 
(R70-85) 
Instead of opposing CNA's motion for a more definite 
statement, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
asserting that it was entitled to recover the value of the oil from 
CNA and that the court should rule that CNA had breached its duty 
of good faith under the policy. (R87-115) 
In response, CNA filed a cross motion for summary judgment 
asserting that (a) under Utah law dealing with the interpretation 
of insurance contracts the plain language of the appropriate 
exclusion did not cover plaintiff's loss of oil caused by 
corrosion; (b) the undisputed facts demonstrated that the oil tank 
corroded excluding coverage as a matter of law; and, (c) 
plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims were properly dismissible. 
(R135-204) 
After plaintiff attempted to file a supplemental affidavit and 
a "declaration" of two "fact witnesses," CNA moved to strike the 
same asserting that the statements were inadmissible and 
unsupported by adequate foundation. (R244-45,253-256) 
On June 23, 1997, the court heard oral argument on this matter 
and in part ruled: 
"I'm going to deny summary judgment for 
Plaintiff. I'm going to grant partial summary 
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judgment for the Defendant, finding that the 
clear language of the insurance contract, loss 
or damage caused by can also be read to mean 
loss or damage resulting from. 
Finding that if the loss of the tank - if 
the hole was caused by rust or corrosion, and 
the oil leaked through that hole, that the 
insurance contract does not insure that loss. 
I think that is the interpretation that 
can be garnered from a plain reading of the 
language. I understand that there are 
certainly ways of reading things differently 
and I recognize that case law suggests that if 
an insurance contract is subject to reasonably 
be read two different ways, that it ought to 
be construed against the drafter, so that as 
broad a coverage as can be reasonably 
contemplated ought to be enforced. 
I'm just - it's a struggle for me to read 
"caused by" to limit it simply to the item 
that is corroded or the item that is rusted or 
the item that is damaged by vermin or by 
freezing or by mechanical breakdown; but ought 
to properly be read to include those items 
which are a direct consequence of the excluded 
items." 
(R277 at p.39) 
Thereafter, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, the court 
essentially ruled on plaintiff's bad faith claims by concluding 
that (a) the loss in question was not covered; (b) CNA did not "take 
a tortured or strained reading to avoid coverages as a business 
decision"; and (c) CNA's motivation was an "appropriate, fair 
reading of the language in the contract." (R277 at pg. 43) 
Thereafter on October 1, 1997, the court entered its Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law and ordered: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. When the language of a policy of 
insurance is susceptible to two or more 
plausible interpretations, the language is 
ambiguous and must be construed in favor of 
coverage to the insured. 
2. The language in the MOAC policy of 
insurance covering exclusions from coverage 
contained only one plausible interpretation 
and therefore is clear and unambiguous. 
3 . The loss of the oil was caused by 
rust or corrosion within the meaning of the 
exclusion from coverage in the insurance 
policy. 
4. Based upon the clear language of the 
contract, Defendant MOAC properly denied 
coverage for the claim for lost oil presented 
by S.W. Energy. 
5. S.W. Energy's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
6. Because MOAC's denial of coverage was 
proper and timely/ MOAC is not subject to any 
claim for bad faith, fraudulent insurance 
acts, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty or 
punitive damages. 
7. An insurer does not violate its 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing to 
an insured by denying coverage when an insured 
claims a different interpretation of the 
insurance policy so long as the insurer has no 
bad motive in denying coverage. 
8. MOAC's cross motion for summary 
judgment is granted. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby 
order that Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. Defendant's motion for 
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summary judgment on all claims is granted." 
(R267-268) 
Plaintiff appealed the court's ruling on October 30, 1997. 
(R270-271) 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The loss at issue in this case occurred on November 27, 
1995, when an oil tank on plaintiff's site ruptured spilling the 
oil contained in the tank^Rl-g)1 
2. At the time of the loss, the Plaintiff was insured by an 
"Oil and Gas Lease Property" policy issued by MOAC a subsidiary of 
Defendant CNA. See Exhibit "A".(R138,157-158) 
3. The relevant policy insuring agreement and exclusionary 
language provided: 
THIS POLICY INSURES AGAINST: 
All risks of direct physical loss of or damage 
to the property covered except as hereinafter 
provided. 
THIS POLICY DOES NOT INSURE AGAINST: 
Loss or damage caused by vermin, wear and 
tear, gradual deterioration or inherent 
defect, rust, corrosion, freezing, faulty 
design .... 
See Exhibit "A". (R138,157-158) 
xDefense counsel on appeal includes the same firm that 
participated in the motion for summary judgment below. 
Accordingly, defense counsel may at times repeat verbatim their 
argument below, without quotation marks but with record citations 
added. 
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4. The notice of loss which was sent to CNA on December 14, 
1995 contained a description of the loss as "Bottom of tank 
exploded on site of oil field." See Exhibit "B".(R138,159) 
5. The notice provided by Swett & Crawford to CNA repeated 
the loss statement describing the loss as an explosion. See 
Exhibit "C" . An additional notice of loss sent to CNA repeated the 
loss statement describing the loss as an explosion. (R138,160) 
6. In its diary of the matter, the CNA adjuster initially 
noted that the plaintiff was making a claim for the lost oil. The 
diary entry reflects a review of the policy noting that it "covers 
crude oil in tanks with exclusions of wear and tear, gradual 
deterioration, rust, corrosion and so on." See Exhibit "D", 
p.l.(R138-139,161). 
7. On December 15, 1995, the adjuster's diary reflects that 
the CNA Heavy Equipment division was assigned to travel to Utah to 
inspect the tank and investigate the loss. See Exhibit "D", p.2. 
(R139,162; see also R163-168). 
8. On January 11, 1996 the company, "Double Tank" submitted 
an estimate for the cost of repairing the tank. In its proposal, 
the company stated that the tank had failed because of corrosion 
and temperature change. See Exhibit "E".(R139,169-178) 
9. On January 12, 1996 CNA's status report indicated that it 
had requested a copy of the BLM incident report as part of its 
investigation of the incident. See Exhibit UF" . (R139,179-182). 
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10. The BLM investigation concluded that the oil spilled as 
a result of corrosion to the tank. On February 8, 1996, less than 
two months after first being notified of the loss, CNA informed 
S.W. Energy of the results of its investigation. By that same 
letter CNA stated, "we must decline coverage in this matter in its 
totality." (emphasis added). See Exhibit "G".(R139,183). 
11. No additional contact with plaintiff is noted in the 
record until over two months later when CNA received a letter from 
plaintiff's counsel dated April 10, 1996 requesting reconsideration 
of the denial of coverage based on alleged "misunderstandings" 
which plaintiff believed led to the denial of coverage for the oil. 
Specifically, plaintiff's counsel was under the impression that CNA 
had not addressed the claim for loss of the oil. See Exhibit 
"H". (R139-140,184-188) . 
12. After receiving this letter, CNA reopened its 
investigation of the matter and hired an independent inspector, 
Garrett Engineers, to investigate the loss. See Exhibit 
"I". (R140,189-200) . 
13. On May 5, 1996 Garrett Engineers conducted a supplemental 
investigation of the incident at CNA's expense. Id. 
14. On June 5, 1996 Garrett Engineers provided its report to 
CNA regarding its investigation. Id. 
15. That same day, CNA confirmed to plaintiff's counsel its 
denial of coverage for the entire claim (i.e. lost oil) based upon 
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the "corrosion exclusion". The letter clearly stated that the 
factual investigation revealed, "corrosion of the tank as the cause 
of the oil seepage." See Exhibit "J". (R140,201). 
16. Plaintiff filed suit on August 1, 1996. (Rl) 
17. After limited discovery was exchanged in this case, CNA 
filed a motion for more definite statement on plaintiff's 
allegations of fraud. See (R70-76). 
18. Rather than opposing CNA's motion for a more definite 
statement, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment 
arguing that the policy covered the loss of the oil and that CNA 
had breached its duty of good faith under the policy. (R87-114). 
19. CNA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting 
that (a) under Utah law interpreting insurance contracts the policy 
language at issue did not cover plaintiff's loss of oil caused by 
corrosion; (b) the undisputed facts demonstrated that the tank 
corroded excluding coverage as a matter of law; and (c) plaintiff's 
bad faith and fraud claims should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
(R135-204 including exhibits) 
20. Almost a month after CNA filed its cross-motion for 
summary judgment, plaintiff filed the Supplemental Affidavit of 
Richard P. Smoot and the "Declaration of Jim Pinneo" . In his 
Affidavit Mr. Smoot identified himself as plaintiff's president and 
without laying any foundation for the same, attempted to offer 
expert opinions regarding the cause of the loss: 
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7. Photograph No. 1 shows that much of 
the surface of the tank is covered by a very 
thin layer of rust, as is normal for tanks of 
this age and type of construction. However, 
the rust is only superficial, and does not 
adversely affect the strength or integrity of 
the steel plate. 
• • * 
12 . The outlet through which crude oil 
is removed from the tank is located several 
inches above the bottom of the tank, as shown 
in Photograph No.2. Therefore, even when the 
crude oil in the tank is drained as fully as 
possible and loaded into trucks for shipment 
to a refinery, several inches of crude oil 
remain in the bottom of the tank. 
• • * 
14. The tank includes a hot oil 
recirculating system, which was installed as 
part of the tank's original design and 
construction. The purpose of the 
recirculating system is to pump and circulate 
heated crude oil into the tank, thereby 
circulating, mixing and heating the oil in the 
tank to facilitate removal into oil tanker 
trucks for transportation to an oil refinery. 
• * * 
17. The tank failed at the point where 
one of the legs of the support plate was 
welded to the floor of the tank, as shown in 
Photographs No. 3,4 and 5. The welds 
attaching the other three legs to the tank 
floor are still sound and intact. 
• * * 
19. The crude oil produced from the 
subject well has a relatively high proportion 
of paraffin which, being heavier than other 
fractions, settles to the bottom of the tank. 
Thus, not only was the point of failure never 
exposed to air, it was continuously coated 
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with paraffin while the tank was in use. 
* • * 
21. Following removal of the protective 
paraffin coating, the point of failure was 
initially completely free of any sign of rust 
or corrosion, and was shiny silver in 
appearance. 
22. Since the steam cleaning, as a 
result of being exposed to the air (in 
combination with residual moisture from the 
steam cleaning and subsequent rain and snow), 
a thin film of rust has formed on the newly-
exposed metal surfaces on the interior of the 
tank, as shown in Photographs No. 2,3 and 4 
(which were taken after nearly a year of 
exposure to air and moisture since the tank 
failure) . However, so long as the tank was in 
use, and until the steam cleaning removed the 
protective paraffin coating, corrosion and 
rust were physically impossible at the point 
of failure. 
23. The failure of the tank was not 
caused by corrosion/ but by the failure of the 
weld attaching one of the recirculating system 
support legs to the floor of the tank. 
24. After the weld broke loose, the 
vibration of the recirculating syst€*m 
apparently caused the now-loosened leg to rub 
against the floor of the tank, wearing away 
much of the leg and simultaneously wearing a 
hole in the steel plate or the tank floor, 
until the leg finally punched through the 
remaining thin layer of steel on November 26, 
1995, causing the sudden loss of the contents 
of the tank. 
25. The pitting and cratering caused by 
the repeated movement of the leg against the 
tank floor, as well as the tapered hole -
worn from the inside of the tank toward the 
outside - are clearly visible in Photograph 
No. 5. 
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• • • 
28. The insurance companies' false 
characterization of the tank failure and oil 
loss flies in the face of the actual, clearly 
observed facts: There was no seepage or 
leakage of oil whatsoever prior to the sudden 
and catastrophic failure of the tank. There 
was no corrosion, slowly enlarging the hole 
month after month. The hole occurred suddenly 
and unexpectedly when the broken support leg 
finally punched through the floor of the tank 
on the - night of November 26, 1995, and the 
entire tank contents were lost before the next 
morning. 
29. When this lawsuit was originally 
filed, S.W. Energy sought only the value of 
the lost crude oil. While we still believe 
that the damage to the tank was ultimately 
caused by the broken weld, and is therefore 
also a covered loss under the policy, the 
insurers steadfastly (and wrongly) continue to 
assert that the tank was damaged by rust or 
corrosion." 
(R208-211) (emphasis added). 
21. The Declaration of Jim Pinneo similarly lacked 
foundation: 
6. As of later afternoon on November 26, 
1995 and prior to that time, there was and had 
been no loss, leakage or seepage of oil from 
the subject tank. Furthermore, prior to the 
morning of November 27, 1995, there was no 
indication of any impending failure of the 
tank. 
• * * 
8. After the tank failed, the interior 
floor and walls of the tank were still coated 
by crude oil (paraffin) , and it was not 
possible to examine the hole or evaluate the 
cause of the failure in detail. 
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• * * 
10. Following removal of the protective 
coating, the interior walls and floor of the 
tank were initially free of any sign of rust 
or corrosion. In particular, the point of 
failure - where a broken support had punched 
through the floor of the tank - was shiny 
silver in appearance. 
11. The interior surfaces of the tank 
are currently exposed to air and moisture 
through openings in the roof and pipe fittings 
in the wall and floor. As a result, a thin 
film of rust has formed on the newly-exposed 
metal surfaces on the interior of the tank 
since the tank was taken out of service." 
(R219-220) 
22. CNA filed a motion to strike the affidavits as lacking 
foundation (R253-256) and plaintiff opposed the same. (R258-262) 
23. On June 23, 1997, the parties appeared before the court 
and the Honorable William A. Thorne ruled in part as follows: 
"I'm going to deny summary judgment for 
Plaintiff. I'm going to grant partial summary 
judgment for the Defendant, finding that the 
clear language of the insurance contract, loss 
or damage caused by can also be read to mean 
loss or damage resulting from. 
Finding that if the loss of the tank - if 
the hole was caused by rust or corrosion, and 
the oil leaked through that hole, that the 
insurance contract does not insure that loss. 
I think that is the interpretation that 
can be garnered from a plain reading of the 
language. I understand that there are 
certainly ways [sic] of reading things 
differently and I recognize that case law 
suggests that if an insurance contract is 
subject to reasonably be read two different 
ways, that it ought to be construed against 
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the drafter, so that as broad a coverage as 
can be reasonably contemplated ought to be 
enforced. 
I'm just - it's a struggle for me to read 
"caused by" to limit it simply to the item 
that is corroded or the item that is rusted or 
the item that is damaged by vermin or by 
freezing or by mechanical breakdown; but ought 
to properly be read to include those items 
which are a direct consequence of the excluded 
items." 
(R277 at p.39) 
24. Thereafter on October 1, 1997, the court entered Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The hole in the tank in which the oil 
was being stored was caused by rust. 
2. The oil was lost because of the hole 
in the tank. 
3. The oil itself was not rusted or 
corroded. However, since the hole in the tank 
was caused by rust or corrosion, the loss of 
the oil was also caused by rust or corrosion. 
4. The decision by MOAC to deny coverage 
was the result of a reasonable reading of the 
language of the exclusion. 
5. MOAC denied coverage in a timely 
fashion. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. When the language of a policy of 
insurance is susceptible to two or more 
plausible interpretations, the language is 
ambiguous and must be construed in favor of 
coverage to the insured. 
2. The language in the MOAC policy of 
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insurance covering exclusions from coverage 
contained only one plausible interpretation 
and therefore is clear and unambiguous. 
3. The loss of the oil was caused by 
rust or corrosion within the meaning of the 
exclusion from coverage in the insurance 
policy. 
4. Based upon the clear language of the 
contract, defendant MOAC properly denied 
coverage for the claim for lost oil presented 
by S.W. Energy. 
5. S.W. Energy's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
6. Because MOAC's denial of coverage was 
proper and timely, MOAC is not subject to any 
claim for bad faith, fraudulent insurance 
acts, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty or 
punitive damages. 
7. An insurer does not violate its 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing to 
an insured by denying coverage when an insured 
claims a different interpretation of the 
insurance policy so long as the insurer has no 
bad motive in denying coverage. 
8. MOAC's cross motion for summary 
judgment is granted. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby 
order that Plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on all claims is granted. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
WILLIAM A. THORNE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
(R266-268) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that the loss of oil 
claimed by S.W. Energy was specifically and clearly excluded under 
the plain and unambiguous language of the CNA insurance policy. 
S.W. Energy's proposed construction of the policy is contrary to 
the plain language of the policy and to applicable Utah laws of 
contract construction. 
In addition, the trial court appropriately concluded that CNA 
made a prompt and appropriate investigation of the claim and acted 
directly and promptly in denying coverage. Since the court 
concluded that CNA's interpretation of the policy in its denial of 
coverage was accurate, any bad faith claim or other causes of 
action fail as a matter of law. 
Finally, since the supplemental affidavit and declaration 
offered by plaintiff to oppose summary judgment were based upon 
statements lacking foundation, they were appropriately subject to 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED CNA SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SINCE THE PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY 
EXCLUSION DID NOT COVER THE PLAINTIFFS LOSS OF OIL 
CAUSED BY CORROSION AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATED 
THAT THE TANK CORRODED. 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS. 
As presented to the trial court below2: 
In Utah, summary judgment is proper where 
there are no genuine issues of material fact 
in dispute and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. See Village Inn 
Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 
790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990). In the 
context of insurance policies, the 
interpretation of its terms is a question of 
law. Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850 
P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). Further, the 
question of whether a policy provision is 
ambiguous is a question of law to be 
determined by the court. Id. 
With respect to Plaintiff's claims of bad 
faith, the trial court properly determined as 
a matter of law that Defendant's conduct in 
this matter was reasonable since CNA was 
entitled to summary judgment. Even if CNA had 
not been entitled to summary judgment the 
court could conclude that Defendant's conduct 
was reasonable under the "fairly debatable" 
standard. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. 
Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996). 
R at 141-142 
2For purposes of the following argument, CNA reincorporates 
its analysis at R141-155 and R246-251. In addressing its motion to 
strike, CNA also reincorporates the argument at R253-256. 
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B. UNDER UTAH LAW, INSURANCE COMPANIES IN UTAH ARE TO BE 
INTERPRETED LIKE ORDINARY CONTRACTS, 
As this court succinctly reiterated in First American Title 
Insurance Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 34 3 Utah Adv. Rep.6,7(May 12, 
1998, #960530) : 
"[a]n insurance policy is merely a contract 
between the insured and the insurer and is 
construed pursuant to the same rules applied 
to ordinary contracts." (stating that "the 
terms of insurance contracts . . . are to be 
interpreted in accordance with their usually 
accepted meanings and should be read as a 
whole, in an attempt to harmonize and give 
effect to all of the contract provisions"). 
In sum, "if a policy is not ambiguous, no 
presumption in favor of the insured arises and 
the policy language is construed according to 
its usual and ordinary meaning. 
Moreover, . . . the foregoing rule also 
applies to policy provisions excepting certain 
losses from coverage. It is well settled that 
an "insurer may exclude certain losses from 
coverage if it uses 'language which clearly 
and unmistakably communicates to the insured 
the specific circumstances under which the 
expected coverage will not be provided.'" A 
provision excepting certain losses from 
coverage is therefore not automatically 
construed against the insurer. Rather, it is 
only when the insurer uses language that is 
ambiguous, that "doubt is resolved against the 
insurer". 
A policy is ambiguous only if it is not 
"plain to a person of ordinary intelligence 
and understanding." A contract may be 
ambiguous because it is unclear or omits terms 
or ... "if the terms used to express the 
intention of the parties may be understood to 
have two or more plausible meanings." 
However, policy terms are not necessarily 
ambiguous just because one party seeks to 
endow them with a different interpretation 
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according to his or her own interests. 
Rather, the other interpretation proposed must 
be plausible and reasonable in light of the 
language used. 
(Citations omitted). 
C. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EXCLUSION DOES NOT COVER 
THE PLAINTIFFS LOSS OF OIL CAUSED BY CORROSION, 
Plaintiff's entire argument is seemingly premised on the 
argument that the exclusionary clause does not mirror the insuring 
clause and is, therefore, ambiguous in application and must be 
interpreted to include coverage.3 
Plaintiff essentially argued that the conflict between the 
coverage and exclusionary clauses creates an ambiguity. Plaintiff 
then argued that because the insuring clause speaks of "direct 
physical losses" the exclusionary language should also be construed 
to exclude only "direct physical losses" to cure the ambiguity. 
See Plaintiff's brief, at pg. 9. Plaintiff concluded by arguing 
that the ambiguity in coverage must be resolved in its favor based 
on its reasonable expectation-of coverage. Id. at pg. 10. While 
the logic of the argument has some initial appeal, plaintiff's 
3Plaintiff argues: 
The policy excluded coverage for "loss or damage" caused by rust or 
corrosion, reading the insuring clause (which insured against "direct" 
loss or damage) together with the exclusion, the Policy clearly excluded 
"direct" loss caused by corrosion - i.e., any holes in or other damage 
to the tank directly caused by corrosion. . . . However, the oil did not 
corrode, it was lost because it was unexpectedly and accidently spilled 
out onto the ground. A reasonable insured would understand the loss of 
the oil to be covered by the insurance for which he had paid premiums 
year after year, even if the Tank itself was not. 
See, Plaintiff's brief, at 9-10. 
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foundational premise -- that the insuring and exclusionary clauses 
are inconsistent and therefore ambiguous --is fundamentally flawed 
in two respects. 
First, it is plaintiff's own proposed interpretation of the 
exclusionary clause which creates the alleged ambiguity. Indeed, 
plaintiff's proposed construction is contrary to the plain language 
of the clause. According to Utah's rules of construction, if the 
plain meaning of the clause is unambiguous, the ordinary meaning of 
the term will be applied by the Court. See Alf v. State Farm and 
Cas.Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). 
Second, plaintiff's attempt to "force harmony and consistency7' 
between the insuring clause and the exclusionary clause is contrary 
to Utah law. Under Utah law, conflicts between an insuring 
agreement and the language of the exclusionary clause do not render 
a policy ambiguous. In fact, this Court in Alf, ^rejected an 
insured's attempt to have conflicts between an insuring clause 
language and exclusionary clause considered ambiguous so that 
coverage could be found. 
The plaintiffs in Alf sued their insurer for coverage when a 
water pipe burst and eroded their land, causing subsidence to their 
insured property. The insurer denied coverage based on a 
subsidence exclusion in the policy and the plaintiffs sued. 
Similar to the claims in this case, the plaintiffs in Alf evidently 
argued that "the policy's explicit coverage for broken pipes and 
21 
the exclusion denying recover for damage caused by earth movement 
(which was, in turn, caused by a broken pipe) renders coverage so 
doubtful and uncertain that the Policy is ambiguous." Alf, at 1274. 
The plaintiffs in Alf were apparently arguing what plaintiff 
is asserting here; namely that the conflicts between the insuring 
clause and the exclusionary clause create an ambiguity in the 
policy which must be resolved in favor of coverage. This Court 
rejected the argument stating: 
The alleged ambiguity is not a result of unclear 
language. Instead, the Alfs claim the exclusion is 
inconsistent with the expected coverage and that the 
inconsistency creates an ambiguity in the policy. 
However, this logic would prevent application of any 
exclusion since exclusions are necessarily inconsistent 
with coverage. 
Alf, at 1275 (emphasis added) . This Court then specifically 
declined to find that conflicts between the insuring clause and the 
exclusionary clause rendered the policy "ambiguous", because such 
a ruling "would render any exclusion invalid simply because it 
conflicts with the stated coverage in some way." Id. 
Similarly, in this case plaintiff's entire argument succeeds 
or fails based on plaintiff's own presumption that the alleged 
conflicts between the insuring clause and the exclusionary clause 
create ambiguity when applied to the facts. Plaintiff's initial 
premise (that the exclusionary language must be modified to exclude 
"only direct losses" in this case) has been specifically rejected 
by this Court in the Alf case as an improper rule of contract 
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construction, and plaintiff has failed to distinguish these facts 
from that decision. 
Plaintiff's claim is further defeated by the this Court's 
analysis of the "causation" issue in Alf. The plaintiffs in Alf 
apparently argued that the exclusionary clause should not apply 
because of the "efficient proximate cause" doctrine. The 
plaintiffs also evidently claimed that the broken pipe (a covered 
loss) was the efficient cause of the subsidence (an excluded loss) 
and should, therefore, not have been excluded under the policy. 
Alf at 1275. In response, this Court seemingly recognized that the 
"efficient proximate cause" doctrine should be acknowledged in Utah 
in certain circumstances. Indeed the Court ruled that, in 
determining coverage, "the efficient cause - the one that sets 
others in motion - is the cause to which the loss is to be 
attributed." Alf, at 1277. This Court, however, specifically 
limited the application of the efficient clause doctrine to cases 
"only when the parties have not chose to freely contract out of 
it." Alf, at 1277. The Court then stated that plain language of 
the policy in Alf clearly excluded the loss, rendering the doctrine 
inapplicable. 
As in Alf, the plain language of the policy in the present 
case does not permit application of the efficient proximate cause 
rule. As in Alf there is no ambiguity in the language of the 
exclusionary clause. However, even if the doctrine was applied, 
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the efficient proximate cause of the loss of the oil was an 
excluded event, i.e., the corrosion of the tank. Therefore, "the 
efficient cause - the one that sets others in motion" was corrosion 
of the tank and is "the cause to which the loss is to be 
attributed".4 Accordingly, the exclusionary clause applies even 
though the loss occurred to property which was not itself corroded 
or spoiled. 
D. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT THE TANK CORRODED 
EXCLUDING COVERAGE AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
Having demonstrated that the exclusionary provision applies to 
this loss, the only remaining issue is whether the claimed loss was 
caused by corrosion. The undisputed evidence before this Court 
demonstrates that the independent expert hired by CNA to 
investigate the matter found that the rust and corrosion caused 
holes in the tank. The oil escaped from the holes onto the ground. 
This conclusions was also supported by the BLM investigation as 
well as the information provided by Double-Tank. See supra, pp. 8-
10. 
4Plaintiff's argument that the oil was lost because it spilled 
onto the ground rather than as a result of the corrosion is the 
same type of argument rejected by other courts. The court in 
Bettigole v. American Employers Ins. Co., 567 N.E. 2d. 1259 (Mass. 
App. 1991) noted, "It will not escape notice that if the 
plaintiff's view were adopted, the corrosion exclusion would tend 
to disappear altogether because some similar agent of the process 
could always be identified, n.5." Footnote 5, in relevant portion 
reads/"the question of multiple and concurrent causes in property 
damages insurance lends itself to logic chopping as well as 
philosophic reflection. Bettigole, at 1276. (Citations omitted). 
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E. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT AND CITED CASE LAW FAIL. 
Plaintiff misses the point in focusing its argument on the 
claim that there is a significant difference in this case between 
whether the oil was lost as a direct or indirect result of 
corrosion. As noted above, the plain language of the policy does 
not distinguish between direct and indirect losses. The plain 
language of the insuring clause of the policy covers losses to the 
materials and equipment listed. The exclusion does not limit 
itself to direct losses. The plain language of the exclusion 
simply and plainly states that losses caused by corrosion are 
excluded under the policy. Plaintiff does not dispute that the 
loss of the oil was caused by corrosion. See Plaintiff's Brief at 
p. 7. Instead, plaintiff evidently insists on focusing on whether 
the loss of the oil was directly or indirectly related to the 
corrosion. Such an interpretation of the exclusionary language is 
artificially forced and goes well beyond the plain language of the 
policy. 
In short, plaintiff's own subjective attempt to read the 
policy to include the words "directly" and "indirectly" 
illustrates that for plaintiff's interpretation to prevail, 
plaintiff must read into the policy more than the plain language 
permits. Accordingly, there is no ambiguity in the terms of the 
contract and no presumptions or strict constructions are to be 
applied in analyzing the policy language. 
25 
Next, if this Court were to believe plaintiff's claim that the 
unambiguous policy provisions do not cover loss of the oil from 
corrosion or rust, and that "the oil was not rusted or corroded in 
this case" (See plaintiff's Brief at page 16) this Court could just 
as easily conclude that there is no coverage in this case because 
the oil is not lost. In short, in applying plaintiff's strained 
interpretation of the policy, this Court could conclude that 
plaintiff's oil is not lost because plaintiff knows it is in the 
ground around the tank and the policy does not cover removing it 
from the ground. Thus, plaintiff's suggestion that the policy was 
intended only to cover rust or corrosion of oil which neither rusts 
or corrodes (See Plaintiff's Brief at page 16, "crude oil is not 
susceptible to rust or corrosion") is more ludicrous than 
suggesting that there is no coverage in this case becamse the oil 
cannot be lost when plaintiff knows where it is. Further, by 
admitting that oil neither rusts or corrodes (See plaintiff's Brief 
at page 16) plaintiff effectually acknowledges that the only 
reasonable reading of the policy exclusion in this case is that 
there will be no coverage if the oil is lost because of rust or 
corrosion of the tank. Otherwise, if applied only to the oil, the 
policy exclusion would be meaningless. 
In addition, the case of Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. v. Royal 
Indemnity Co. , 879 S.W. 2d 920 (Tex. App. 1994) cited by plaintiff 
in support of its arguments is inapposite to the facts of this 
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case, Pioneer dealt with a completely different type of policy and 
dissimilar policy language. In Pioneer, the policy in question was 
a general "boiler and machinery" policy, and the key issue in the 
case was whether damages caused by the release of tons of chlorine 
into the atmosphere was an "accident" and thereby covered under the 
policy language. 
The policy in Pioneer provided that Royal Indemnity co. would 
pay for "direct damage to covered property caused by a covered 
cause of loss." A "covered cause of loss" was defined by the 
policy as "an accident to an object," and an "accident" was in turn 
defined as "a sudden and accidental breakdown of the 'object' or 
part of the 'object.' Id. at 925. Further the policy stated that 
"depletion, deterioration, corrosion or erosion" was not an 
"accident" under the meaning of the policy. Id. 
In its argument, Royal evidently argued that since the 
internal direct damage to the chlorine liquifier was caused by 
corrosion and was not therefore an "accident" under the terms of 
the policy, the resulting damages when the liquifier "suddenly and 
accidentally" spewed 46 tons of chlorine into the atmosphere was 
also not an "accident," and its denial of coverage was rightful. 
Id. at 926. To the contrary, Pioneer argued that the incident was 
covered by the policy "because although erosion or corrosions [sic] 
itself cannot be an accident under the Policy, an accident which 
results from erosion or corrosions [sic] is a risk covered by the 
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policy." Id. The Court agreed with Pioneer, that while the policy 
definition of "accident" excluded corrosion, it did not exclude a 
sudden and accidental breakdown which might have been caused by 
corrosion. Id. at 928. 
Although the Texas Court of Appeals held in favor of the 
plaintiff in Pioneer, the type of "boiler and machinery" policy in 
Pioneer was not the type of policy in this case. Indeed, there is 
no language in CNA's policy similar to that upon which the 
plaintiff in Pioneer relied. Instead, the policy in this case does 
not insure plaintiff against "loss or damage caused by vermin, wear 
and tear, gradual deterioration or inherent defect, rust, 
corrosion, freezing, faulty design . . ." See Statement of 
Undisputed Facts, fl 3 (emphasis added). Thus, the policy in this 
case specifically excludes damage caused by corrosion, where the 
policy in Pioneer did not. Moreover, the meaning of an "accident" 
and what is considered an "accident" for the purpose of coverage in 
the Pioneer policy does not reflect the language in this policy. 
Finally, the Pioneer Court noted that in the cases it reviewed in 
which coverage was denied, including Bettigole v. American 
Employers Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 1259 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), 
Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wasau Paper Mills, 818 F.2d 
5 91 (7th Cir. 1986) and Adams-Arapahoe Joint Venture School Dist. 
No. 28-J v. Continental Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1989), the 
policies in question contained express language excluding from 
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coverage loss caused by corrosion. Therefore, the court in 
Pioneer, implicitly acknowledges the validity of such exclusions. 
Royal could have excluded the loss by merely expressly stating that 
damages caused by corrosion were excluded (See Pioneer, 879 S.W.2d 
at 929, 934, 935), as the policy at issue in this case expressly 
states. 
In summary, the focus in Pioneer was whether or not a loss or 
damage caused by an "accident", which "accident" was in turn caused 
by corrosion, was excluded. In this case, S.W. Energy's policy 
contains an exclusion for "loss or damage" caused by corrosion. 
This causation language in the S.W. Energy policy was precisely the 
language "missing" in Pioneer's policy, which allowed for an 
"accident caused by corrosion to be covered." Since S.W. Energy's 
policy contains causation language and unambiguously excludes 
"damage caused by corrosion" the analysis in Pioneer has no 
application and the trial court correctly granted Defendant summary 
j udgment. 
POINT II, 
S.W. ENERGY'S BAD FAITH AND FRAUD CLAIMS PROPERLY FAILED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. BAD FAITH LAW. 
In Utah, bad faith may be shown by demonstrating that the 
insurer made an inadequate investigation and/or took a position 
which was not fairly debatable. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. 
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Co. , 918 P. 2d 461 (Utah App. 1996) . It is axiomatic that where the 
insurer's position is correct, the issue of bad faith is rendered 
moot. In this case, CNA's position was, at very least, fairly 
debatable, entitling CNA to Summary Judgment as a matter of law on 
that claim, even if there are other issues which preclude Summary 
Judgment in favor of CNA on the merits. 
1. INVESTIGATION ISSUE. 
Plaintiff does not assert in its brief that CNA's 
investigation was not timely, thorough or fair. However, even if 
such a claim is raised it fails in light of the undisputed facts. 
See supra, pp. 7-10. CNA made a prompt investigation, and when the 
decision was questioned by plaintiff's counsel, CNA promptly 
retained an independent expert to investigate the matter again. In 
Alf, the disposition of the coverage issue in favor of the insurer 
also disposed of the bad faith claims as a matter of law. See Alf 
at 1272. 
2. FAIRLY DEBATABLE ISSUE, 
Plaintiff apparently argues that CNA's interpretation of the 
policy, and the resulting denial of coverage was not "fairly 
debatable" as that term has been defined by this Court. Plaintiff 
essentially asserts because its own reading of the policy is 
plausible, any differing opinion would be neither plausible nor 
fairly debatable. Resolution of this argument goes hand-in-hand 
with the issue of whether there was coverage in this case. As 
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analyzed above, because there was no coverage for the loss, CNA was 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Further, 
plaintiff has failed to establish how CNA should have been aware 
that its analysis of the specific policy language was incorrect or 
unreasonable. In fact, the plain reading of the policy (as Utah 
Courts require) favors the interpretation CNA reached. See 
generally, Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 
1996) . 
Moreover, even if on appeal this Court concludes that the 
undisputed facts do not demonstrate that CNA was entitled to 
summary judgment, it would necessarily follow that CNA's position 
is fairly debatable or the trial court would not have found in 
CNA's favor. CNA does not propose a strained or hyper-technical 
reading of the Policy in an effort to avoid coverage. Instead, CNA 
encourages a plain reading of the policy. Plaintiff's proposed 
construction of the policy, on the other hand, is the one which 
requires assumption, inference and a construction contrary to plain 
language and common sense. 
B. PLAINTIFFS CITED AUTHORITY DEFEATS CLAIMS OF BAD 
FAITH IN THIS CASE. 
Notwithstanding the fact that a reasonable investigation was 
conducted and CNA assumed a reasonable position in regards to 
coverage in this case, plaintiff's cited authority in Pioneer Chlor 
Alkali Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 879 S.W. 2d 920 (Tex. App. 1994) 
defeats plaintiff's claims of bad faith. In that case, the Texas 
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court found that the insurance company's position was fairly 
debatable as a matter of law, even though the court found in favor 
of the Plaintiff and against the insurer on the interpretation of 
policy 1 anguage. (See Id.) The Court stated that despite the 
conflicting case law from other jurisdictions, the Defendant's 
position with respect to the interpretation of its contract under 
Texas law was reasonable: 
Thus, even if we take Pioneer's position that Royal 
knew about these out-of-state cases when it denied 
coverage, it does not support Pioneer's claim that 
Royal breached its duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. As long as Royal had some reasonable 
basis to deny the claim there is no breach. 
Evidence that merely shows a bona fide dispute 
about the insurer's liability on the insurance 
contract does not rise to the level of bad faith. 
879 S.W.2d at 940. 
And the Court reasoned: "Nor is bad faith established when a 
trier of fact, using hindsight, decides the insurer was simply 
wrong about the proper construction of the terms of the policy." 
Id. 
The fact that we have determined that 
coverage exists is immaterial to the breach of 
duty claim in this case. "The issue in bad 
faith focuses not on whether the claim was 
valid, but on the reasonableness of the 
insurer's conduct in rejecting the claim." 
879 S.W.2d at 940. The Pioneer court then ruled that the insurer 
in that case fulfilled its duties by conducting a reasonable 
investigation prior to denying coverage. The Court concluded, "The 
record shows as a matter of law that Royal did conduct an 
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investigation and therefore, did not breach its duty of good faith 
and fair dealing." Pioneer at 941. 
Consistent with the court's analysis in Pioneer, this Court 
should recognize that CNA undertook a reasonable investigation and, 
when requested to by plaintiff's counsel, reopened the matter and 
conducted a further investigation of the facts before finally and 
timely denying coverage. These undisputed facts, coupled with the 
reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the policy and 
Utah's contract construction principles, demonstrates that CNA did 
not engage in bad faith as a matter of law. Plaintiff's cited 
authority supported this finding and CNA was thus entitled to 
summary judgment on the issue of bad faith and fraud. 
C- IF AN INSURER PREVAILS ON AN UNDERLYING CLAIM IT 
CANNOT AS A MATTER OF LAW HAVE ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN ITS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH A POLICYHOLDER, 
Since CNA prevailed on the underlying claim as a matter of law 
it could not have acted in bad faith in denying plaintiff's claim. 
''Clearly Plaintiff could never show an absence of a reasonable 
basis for denial of benefits if the insurer can prove that no 
benefits were owed under the policy. If the insurer prevails on 
the breach of contract action, it could not, as a matter of law, 
have acted in bad faith in its relationship with its policyholder." 
Bartlett v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 1000 
(Rhode Island 1988) . The basis for a bad faith action must be a 
valid claim. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 802 P.2d 1071, 
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1073 (Arizona App. 1990) . If the defendant insurer prevails on 
liability, then the defendant's conduct necessarily cannot have 
been in bad faith. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 
SW.2d 668, 673 (Texas App. 1993). 
In short, plaintiff's claims of bad faith and fraud are 
ridiculous when the trial court concluded that there was a 
reasonable basis for CNA denying benefits as a matter of law. By 
prevailing on the underlying claim, CNA met the underlying standard 
of a reasonable basis for denying benefits. Further, even if this 
Court were to reverse the trial court's ruling as to coverage under 
the policy, plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims must fail since 
the issue of coverage was at least fairly debatable to cause the 
trial court to conclude that the policy language did not cover the 
claim. 
POINT III, 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT CNA'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
WAS EFFECTIVELY GRANTED AND IMPROPER TESTIMONY BY 
PLAINTIFFS WITNESSES WAS INADMISSABLE. 
A. RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PROHIBITED THE TRIAL COURT FROM CONSIDERING INADMISSABLE 
FACTUAL STATEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE UNSUPPORTED 
BY ADEQUATE FOUNDATION. 
After CNA moved for summary judgment alleging that the 
undisputed facts indicated that the rupture of the tank was due to 
corrosion, plaintiff filed the supplemental affidavit of Richard P. 
Smoot and the "declaration" of Jim Pinneo setting forth their 
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opinions regarding the cause of the tank's failure. 
In response, CNA moved to strike the supplemental affidavit 
and declaration claiming that the opinions and conclusions stated 
therein lacked foundation and were inadmissable under Utah law (See 
R at 244, 245, 253, 257). 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits 
affidavits to be filed in support of or in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment so long as the affidavits "set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence." Nevertheless, in 
attempting to avoid summary judgment in this case plaintiff 
presented the affidavit of Mr. Smoot which was essentially in the 
form of an expert opinion. However Mr. Smoot had not provided the 
requisite foundation to support his conclusions regarding the 
causation aspects of the case. 
In Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990) the Utah Court 
of Appeals ruled that Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows 
an expert to state his opinion concerning the ultimate issue in the 
case, but requires the expert provide a sufficient factual basis 
for the opinions he proffers. Nowhere in the supplemental 
affidavit does Mr. Richard Smoot effectively provide sufficient 
foundation for his conclusions regarding the cause of the tank's 
failure. As a result, his opinions should be deemed speculative, 
conclusory, and not admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Further, Mr. Smoot failed to demonstrate that he had the requisite 
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expertise to testify regarding metallurgy or failure analysis of 
metals, drums or other surfaces at issue in this case. 
Specifically, paragraphs 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 28 of Mr. 
Smoot's affidavit lacked adequate expert foundation. In short, 
Smoot's opinions regarding the cause of the failure of the tank in 
this case were inadmissible. (See R at 207-217) 
The declaration of Mr. Pinneo was no more helpful to plaintiff 
than the affidavit of Mr. Smoot. Indeed, Mr. Pinneo failed to 
offer sufficient basis or foundation which would support the 
conclusion he reaches regarding the tank's failure. His 
conclusions were also without sufficient foundation and therefore 
inadmissible to oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment (See 
R at 218-220). 
Other courts have essentially held that where a movant's 
underlying motion for summary judgment is granted, a motion to 
strike is considered moot. See generally Badoni v. Higginson, 455 
F.Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977). 
Although the trial court did not rule on the issue, 
effectively then, this Court should conclude that the supplemental 
affidavit and declaration offered by plaintiff were effectively and 
properly stricken in that there were no admissible facts to dispute 
those CNA presented demonstrating that the failure of the tank was 
caused by corrosion. 
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B. EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR THE 
AFFIDAVITS OR STATEMENTS THAT WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE 
MOTION TO STRIKE, THEIR EFFECT IS MOOT IN THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAS NOW ADMITTED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE TANK'S FAILURE WAS 
CORROSION. 
Even if this Court finds that the affidavits or statements of 
Richard P. Smoot and Jim Pinneo had sufficient foundation to avoid 
CNA's motion to strike, the testimony in those statements is 
essentially moot as plaintiff has now admitted that "the direct 
damage to the tank was caused by rust or corrosion." See 
plaintiff's Brief at p. 7. Thus, the substance of the affidavits 
or statements in question is moot and of no consequence, and the 
trial court's order striking the same is harmless error. 
C. IF THE AFFIDAVITS WERE IMPROPERLY STRICKEN, ALLOWING 
THE SAME WOULD MERELY CAUSE PLAINTIFFS CLAIM TO BE 
DENIED UNDER THE "WEAR AND TEAR" EXCLUSION, 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court improperly struck the 
declaration of Jim Pinneo and the affidavit of Richard P. Smoot, 
the trial court's order constitutes harmless error or brings CNA's 
denial of coverage under the wear and tear policy exclusion, making 
summary judgment proper nonetheless. 
Similar to the "corrosion exclusion", thepolicy excludes all 
damages caused by "wear and tear, gradual deterioration or inherent 
defect." (R at 138). Under Richard Smoot's definition of the 
events, 
after the weld broke loose, the vibration of 
the recirculating system apparently caused the 
now-loosened leg to rub against the floor of 
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the tank, wearing away much of the leg and 
simultaneously wearing a hole in the steel 
plate or the tank floor, until the leg finally 
punched through the remaining layer of thing 
SU66x •••• 
R. at 210-211 (emphasis added). 
Thus, even if the trial court improperly struck Mr. Smoot's 
affidavit, Mr. Smoot's affidavit establishes sufficient reason for 
denial of coverage under the "wear and tear" exclusion in the 
policy, necessitating summary judgment on behalf of CNA, and 
resulting in harmless error. 
CONCLUSION 
CNA properly demonstrated to the trial court that the 
undisputed facts entitled it to summary judgment since the plain 
language of the policy at issue excludes loss of Plaintiff's oil 
caused by corrosion due to the tank holding it. Plaintiff's 
efforts to strain and contort the plain policy language to create 
an ambiguity failed below and do not merit a reversal of this case. 
In addition, the undisputed facts demonstrate at the very 
least that CNA's position in this matter was fairly debatable, if 
not actually correct. Thus, plaintiff's claim for bad faith and 
fraud likewise properly failed. Finally, the affidavit and 
statement plaintiff filed to try to avoid summary judgment lacked 
sufficient foundation to be admissible. Accordingly, CNA was 
entitled to summary judgment and this Court should sustain the 
trial court's ruling in that regard on appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 / ^ day of July, 1998. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN 
JARYL L. RENCHER 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, this ,S/^-—day of July, 1998, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to the following: 
Robert P. Hill, Esq. 
John A. Adams, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South Main Street, Ste. 400 
P.O. Box 45385 





A. MOAC Oil and Gas Lease Property Form. R. 157-158. 
B. ACORD Property Loss Notice, December 14, 1995. R. 159. 
C. Swett Sc Crawford Group, Notice of Claim, November 27, 1995. R. 
160. 
D. Adjuster Contact Record, December 15, 1995, through June 5, 
1996. R. at 161-168. 
E. Double Tank estimate of costs insuring tank, CNA Insurance 
Companies correspondence regarding uninsurable event. R. 
169-178. 
F. BLM Incident report to CNA. R. 179-182. 
G. CNA Declination of Claim, February 8, 1996. R. 183. 
H. Correspondence from S.W. Energy Corp's Counsel to CNA, April 
10, 1996. R. 184-188. 
I. Report of Garrett Engineers, June 5, 1996. R. 189-200. 
J. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Judge William 
A. Thorne, Civil No. 960905357, October 1, 1997. R. 266-269. 
Tab A 
JVKSC 
OIL AND GAS LEASE PROPERTY FORM 
L This policy mtucbes for %J ^'• i J ' ' on property consisting of tanks, pumps, machinery, pipe, and 
aD other similar equipment and/or persona] property of a mobile or floating nature, including all 
crude petroleum in tanks, usual to the operation of a producing Ofl or Gas Well, while situated at 
producing well-sites anywhere within the United States including while in transit as often as may 
be required during the currency of this policy. 
2. PROPERTY EXCLUDED: 
A. Real property and/or structures except temporary sheds, engine booses or belt houses; 
B. Brick, stone or concrete foundations or machinery or equipment, below ground level; 
C Underground piping and contents, fittings, conduits, drains and floes; 
D. Aircraft; 
E. Motor vehicles and/or trailers licensed for use on public highways; 
F. Water borne vessels and their contents; 
C. Railway or railroad rolling stock and contents (except contents on above described premises coo* 
signed to or to be shipped by the Insured while not under control of public carrier); 
H. All property located off shore or beyond shore line; 
I. Pull rods (and supports) from powerhouse to wells; 
J. Gasoline or gas recycling plants; 
K. Refineries; 
L. Drilling derricks, drilling tools and drilling rigs; 
M. Oil tanks of ten thousand (10,000) barrels or over capacity and their contents; 
N. Earthen or concrete flow or storage pits or reservoirs and their contents; 
O. Derricks, unless specifically endorsed hereon. 
3. ACQUISITION CLAUSE 
In consideration of the agreement by the Insured to report additional property on leases insured 
hereunder or on leases acquired subsequent to attachment date of this poDcy, within sixty days from 
the date such additional property values of the same general type as insured hereunder, are acquired, 
and to pay full premium thereon from the date acquired at pro rata of the effective rates, this policy 
covers such additionally acquired property for an amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the 
limit of liability of this policy or $20,000., whichever is greater. This policy shall cease to cover 
such additionally acquired property if it is not reported to the Company within said sixty-day (60): 
period. 
It is further understood and agreed that in the event any owners of interests in said additionally ac-
quired property have been excluded from coverage under lease equipment values already a part of 
this policy, then and In that event, the same interest owners are sunQariy excluded from coverage m 
any additionally acquired property unless, within ten days from the date said additional property is 
acquired, this Company is notified that said interest owners desire protection to the extent of their in-
terests in said additionally acquired property lo be insured and that additional premium computed as 
stated above, will be paid to this Company. 
4. THIS POLICY INSURES AGAINST: 
All risks of direct physical loss of or damage to the property covered except as hereinafter provided. 
5. THIS POLICY DOES NOT INSURE AGAINST: 
A. Loss or damage caused by vermin, wear and tear, gradual deterioration or inherent defect, rust, 
corrosion, freezing, faulty design, mechanical breakdown, and faulty workmanship or materials 
in the course of any renovating, refinishing or repairing process, delay or loss of use. 
B. Loss or damage or expense, if at the time thereof, there is any other insurance which would at-
tach if this insurance had not been effected, e*c*pt.that this teunsacs shall apply only as ex-
cess and in no event as contributing insurance and then only after aS other insurance has been 
exhausted. 
C Loss or damage due to short-circuiting, blow-out, or other electrical disturbances within any 
electrical apparatus, appliance or device insured hereunder unless fire ensues and then for loss 
or damage caused by such ensuing fire only. 
D. Loss or damage caused by the infidelity of the Insured's employees or persons to whom the prop-
erty described herein is entrusted. 
E. Loss or damage caused by blow-out unless fire ensues, and then only for lou or damage directly 
caused by such ensuing fire. 
F. Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, this insurance is warranted free from 
loss or damage caused by or resulting from: (1) Hostile or warlike action in time of peace or war, 
including action in hindering, combating or defending against an actual, impending or expected 
attack (a) by any government or sovereign power (de jure or de facto), or by any authority main-
taining or using military, naval or air forces; or (b) by military, naval or air forces; or (c) by an 
agent of any such government, power, authority or forces; (2) Any weapon employing atomic fission 
131 
or radioactive forces whether in time of peace or war, (3) Insurrection, rebellion, revolution, civil 
war. unsurped power, or action taken by governmental authority in hindering, combating or de-
fending against such an occurrence, seizure or destruction under quarantine or customs regula-
tions, confiscation by order of any government or public authority, or risks of contraband or i l -
legal transportation or trade. 
G. Loss by nuclear reaction or nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination, all whether controlled 
or uncontrolled, proximate or remote, or be in whole or in part caused by, contributed to, or ag-
gravated by the peril(s) insured against in this policy; however, subject to the foregoing and at 
provisions of this policy, direct loss by fire resulting from nuclear reaction or nuclear radiation or 
radioactive contamination not emanating from any weapon of war is insured against by this policy. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
*. DEDUCTIBLE CLAUSE 
Each daim for loss or damage (separately occurring) shall be adjusted separately and from the 
amouQT of each such adjusted daim or the applicable limit of liability, whichever is less, the sum 
of. $ shall be deducted 
7. *0%. COINSURANCE CLAUSE 
"This Company shall be liable in the event of loss for no greater proportion thereof than the amount 
hereby insured bears to 90% of the actual cash value of the property insured hereunder at the time 
suchJoss-shall happen, 
BASIS OF SETTLEMENT CLAUSE: 
Unless otherwise provided, this Company shall not be liable beyond the actual cash value of the prop-
erty at m time any loss or damage occurs and the loss or damage shall be ascertained or estimated 
according to such actual cash value with proper deduction for depreciation, however caused, and 
shall in no event exceed what it would then cost to repair or replace the same with material of like 
kind and quality. 
In the event of claim for loss to crude petroleum, the basis of settlement shall be the posted market 
price thereof on the date of the loss, plus the gathering and transportation charges, phis premium 
value actually paid by Insured but in no case to exceed replacement value of like kind and quality 
at the time and place of loss. 
f. WAIVER OF INVENTORY OR APPRAISEMENT CLAUSE: 
If this policy shall be subject to the conditions of the coinsurance clause, it is also made a condition 
that in the adjustment of any loss hereunder, provided same does not exceed 2% of the total insur-
ance carried, it shall not be a part of compliance with the conditions of a Coinsurance Clause to in-
ventory or appraise the undamaged property. 
10. FOAM LOSS ASSUMPTION CLAUSE: 
A. In consideration of the rate of premium at which this policy is written mis Company shall be 
liable for the loss to foam solution or other fire extinguishing materials lost, expended, or de-
stroyed in fighting fire involving property insured hereunder to the extent only of the value of 
such extinguishing materials which are on the premises, or on adjacent premises if such matrriah 
are jointly owned at the time the fire originates, but this Company shall not be Sable for loss to 
similiar materials which may be brought upon the premises for the purpose of extinguishing a 
fin already in progress at the time such materials are ordered and delivered. 
B. If there shall be any other insurance on the property insured hereunder this Company shall 
only be liable pro rata with such other insurance whether such other insurance be against Ion 
covered hereunder or not and this Company shall only be liable pro rata with all insurance 
covering in any manner the hazards or loss insured against by this policy; anything in this policy 
to the contrary notwithstanding. 
1L LOSS CLAUSE: 
Any loss hereunder shall not reduce the amount of this policy. 
12. SUBROGATION WAIVER CLAUSE: 
Thb insurance shaO not be invalidated if the Insured in writing has waived or may hereafter, but 
prior to the occurrence of any loss covered hereunder, waive its right of recovery from any firm, cor-
poration or individual, for loss coverage hereunder and this Company expressly waives subrogation 
against any subsidiary or affiliate Company of the Insured. 
Attached to and forming part of Policy No. - — . 
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PO Box 17980 
Denver, CO 80217 
Swett&Crauufbrd Group 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
ASSURED: S.W. Energy 
CERTIFICATE/POLICY: IMC488415 
DATE OF ACCIDENT: 11-27-95 
CLAIMANT: Insured 
LOCATION: Grand County, Utah 
BRIEF FACTS: Bottom of tank exploded, 495 barrells of oil lost 
due to bottom of tank exploded on site of oil field. 
DAMAGE EST./SUITE AMT.: Unknown 
ADJUSTER: Please Advise 













Completed: 12-15-95 Diaries Issued: 12-15-95 
Insured: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Ref. No: N/A 
Claimant: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Claim Symbol: INRL Claim Number: 540-6-C3029 Sfx: 0 
Date of Loss: 11-27-95 Date Reported: 12-15-95 
Policy Number: IM 00488415 Policy Period: 10-27-95 to 10-27-96 
Party Contacted: Insured If Other, Please Specify: 
Contact Method: Phone 
Subject: Explosion 
Comment: INSURED OIL & GAS LEASE PROPERTY POLICY COVERS CRUDE PETROL IN TANKS 
WITH EXCLUSIONS FOR WEAR & TEAR, GRADUAL DETERIORATION, RUST, CORROSION AND SO ON. I 
ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT INSURED TWICE, BUT TO NO AVAIL. IN THE INTERIM, I WILL ASSIGN FRED 
HARLOW ( CNA HEAVY EQUIPMENT - 312 822 6423 ) TO THIS MATTER. 
ILI 
Adjuster Follow Up 
Completed: 12-21-95 Diaries Issued: 12-21-95 
Insured: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Ref. No: N/A 
Claimant: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Claim Symbol: INRL Claim Number: 540-6-C3029 Sfx: 0 
Date of Loss: 11-27-95 Date Reported: 12-15-95 
Policy Number: IM 00488415 Policy Period: 10-27-95 to 10-27-96 
Subject: Cna Assignment 
Comment: JOE FERA ( CNA HEAVY EQUIP - 805 272 8938) WAS ASSIGNED TO THIS MATTER BY 
FRED HARLOW. REQUESTED JOE GO TO LOSS SITE PERSONALLY, TO ASCERTAIN SCOPE OF LOSS 
AND TO SOLIDFY A POSSIBLE DECLINATION. 
IITL 
Adjuster Folio w-Up - 90 lys 




S.W. Energy Inc. 
N/A 
S.W. Energy Inc. 
Claim Symbol: 










540-6-C3029 Sfx: 0 
12-15-95 
10-27-95 to 10-27-96 
Comment: SPOKE WITH INSURED, WHO DID NOT RECEIVE MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE, ADVISED 
TANK DID NOT EXPLODE BUT OIL LEAKED OUT OF A HOLE(S) IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TANK. I HAVE 
ASSIGNED JOE FAROS ( CNA HEAVY EQUIPMENT - 805 272 8938) TO THIS MATTER. PRELIMINARY 
INFO INDICATES WEAR & TEAR AND / OR GRADUAL DETERIORATION OF THE TANK CAUSED THE 
SEEPAGE. THERE IS A POLICY EXCLUSION FOR THIS. UNTIL JOE REACHES THE LOSS SITE, IT MAY BE 
PREMATURE FOR A RES OF RIGHTS. 
\i*i 
Adjuster Foliow-Up - 90 iys 
Completed: 01-15-96 Diaries Issued: 01-15-96 
Insured: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Ret. No: N/A 
Claimant: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Claim Symbol: INRL Claim Number: 540-6-C3029 Six: 0 
Date of Loss: 11 -27-95 Date Reported: 12-15-95 
Policy Number: IM 00488415 Policy Period: 10-27-95 to 10-27-96 
Subject: Cna Discussion 
Comment: SPOKE WITH JOE, WHO CONFIRMED, VIA INSPECTION AND DISCUSSIONS WITH SITE 
MANAGER, THE SEEPAGE WAS DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE TANK. HIS REPORT, AS WELL 
AS THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT ( BLM ) REPORT ARE AWAITED, BEFORE ISSUANCE OF THE 
DECLINATION. I WILL FORWARD A RES OF RIGHTS IN THE INTERIM. 
|(,M 
Adjuster Follow-Up - 90 iys 
Completed: 02-08-96 Diaries Issued: 02-08-96 
Insured: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Ref. No: N/A 
Claimant: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Claim Symbol: INRL Claim Number: 540-6-C3029 Sfx: 0 
Date of Loss: 11 -27-95 Date Reported: 12-15-95 
Policy Number: IM 00488415 Policy Period: 10-27-95 to 10-27-96 
Subject: BLM Report 
Comment: SPOKE WITH JOE FARO, WHO HAS REC'D THE BUREAU OF LAND MGT. REPORT, WHICH 
CONFIRMS TANK FAILURE WAS DUE TO THE WEAR & TEAR UPON THE TANK. BLM STATES, PER HIS 
INSPECTION OF THE TANK," THE CAUSE OF EVENT ... BOTTOM OF TANK HAD FLAW AND RUPTURED, 
CAUSED BY WEIGHT OF OIL & SUDDEN CHANGE OF TEMPERATURE ON WATER CONTENT." 
REPAIRER STATES ( WILL LOVATO AT DOUBLE TANK CORP.) PER HIS INSPECTION," THE APPARENT 
CAUSE OF LOSS IS AGE AND WEAR AND TEAR." THERE IS A POLICY EXCLUSION FOR LOSS OR 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY ... WEAR AND TEAR ... CORROSION ... GRADUAL DETERIORATION .... BASED 
UPON ABOVE, DECLINATION OF CLAIM WILL BE SOUGHT. 
IW 
Adjuster Foliow-Up - 90 *ys 
Completed: 04-17-96 Diaries Issued: 04-17-96 
Insured: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Ref. No: N/A 
Claimant: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Claim Symbol: INRL Claim Number: 540-6-C3029 Sfx: 0 
Date of Loss: 11 -27-95 Date Reported: 12-15-95 
Policy Number: IM 00488415 Policy Period: 10-27-95 to 10-27-96 
Subject: Refuter 
Comment: Rec'd letter from ins'd atty disputing validity of claim declination and demanding full payment for 
loss of oil. Instructed Joe Ferro at CNA - Ontario, my onsite adjuster, to query as to whether the tank was 
available for inspection and if so, have a tank expert or metallurgist inspect the tank ASAP and advise as to the 
cause of failure. 
iu 
Adjuster Folio w-Up - 90 iys 
Completed: 05-03-96 Diaries Issued: 05-03-96 
Insured: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Ref. No: N/A 
Claimant: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Claim Symbol: INRL Claim Number: 540-6-C3029 Sfx: 0 
Date of Loss: 11 -27-95 Date Reported: 12-15-95 
Policy Number: IM 00488415 Policy Period: 10-27-95 to 10-27-96 
Subject: Inspection 
Comment: Tank inspection is set for (May 5, 1996) w/ ins'd and our rep (Mike Phillips - 310 537 3647) 
l(TJ 
Adjuster Follow-Up - 9G lys 
Completed: 06-05-96 Diaries Issued: 06-05-96 
Insured: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Ref. No: N/A 
Claimant: S.W. Energy Inc. 
Claim Symbol: INRL Claim Number: 540-6-C3029 Sfx: 0 
Date of Loss: 11-27-95 Date Reported: 12-15-95 
Policy Number: IM 00488415 Policy Period: 10-27-95 to 10-27-96 
Subject: Engineer Analysis 
Comment: Enginer concludes that," along side of welded connection that was completely rusted away was 
a hole approximately 2" wide ... This was the source of the oil spill. The 2" hole hads rusted from the outside ... 
because of a common error made during field fabrications." The analysis confirms the validity of the previously 
forwarded declination and will serve as a basis for the reiteration of the declination. 
iwr 
TabE 
Feb-08-96 05:31P JOE FFRRO 805-272-8938 P 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Heavy Equipment UnitP.O.Box 901540 Palmdale.Caltfomia 93590 
February 8.1996 
Marine Office of America Corporation 
William Patter 
5690 DTC Boulevard 
Englewood.Cotorado 60111 
Claim # 540 6C 3029 
Insured: S.W. Energy 





2)Land Management Report 
3)Photographs 
4)Recorded statement summary 
Reserve 
Set prior to receipt of this toss. 
Assignment 
This assignment to inspect verify if covered loss.determine capacity and evaluate damages to 
tank was received on 12-18-1995. 
Insurance 
Coverage for this toss provided by Continental Insurance policy #00466415 under the Oil and 
Gas Lease Property Form tor $36.500.00.with a $1,000 00 deductMeEffectrve date 10-27-95 
to10-27-96. 
Feb-Oe-96 05:31P JOE FFRRO 805-272-8938 P . 
Insured 
S.W. Energy at 847 E 400 South. Salt Lake City,Utah 84102.Richard Smoct 801-532-6664. 
Risk 
A 500 barrel oil tank buitt by American Tank Steal Corporation in March of 1063 with serial t 
2577 Basic dimensions; IS *" Diameter 16* high Cone bottom design 1/4' steel bottom deck 
and shell. 
Coinsurance 
Review of file does not reflect a coinsurance requirement 
Loss and Damage 
It appears bottom of this tank floor developed a leek,spilting its content of approximately 454 
barrels of oil. This was due to condition.age and type of content 
Recommendations 
Based on the information provided by the report from Utah State Land Management and the 
repair facility Double Tank Corporation. We recommend considering denial of this daim, since 
this spill was due to failure of the tank floor. 
Closing 
This will conclude our activity on this file.lf any questions or concems.please contact me at 
your covenience. 
Joe Ferro 
Heavy Equipment Specialist 
(805) 272-8938 
J 
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303 North Highway 644 
BloomfteUt, New Mexico 87413-2646 
EIN 86-0407821 
Voice (806)632-0611 
F « (506)632-0037 
January 11, 1996 
Joe Ferro 
CNA Insurance 
Via Facsimile (805) 272-8938 
Re: Refurbishing 500bbl Tank 
Vicinity of Green River, Utah 
S.W. Energy 
Dear Mr. Ferro: 
Pursuant to your requestr Double Tank makes the following proposal 
for reconditioning a 500bbl belonging to S.W, Energy$ located on 
the Smoot Federal Lease near Green Riverf Utah: 
Cut and remove existing bottom from tank, replace with 1/4n 
steel flat bottom, replace load coupling and drain coupling 
with API 4* fittings, replace inspection door and door plate. 
Pressure test for leaks, coat bottom with coal tar epoxy. 
Work done on location. Approximate volume of resulting tank, 
440bbl. 
Price, including crew expenses and crane truck, $3,012.50. 
Please do not hesitate to call me should you have any questions. 




Subject: Report u^/tfldesirable Event J 
Date of Occurrence: j2 Time of Occurrence: Ej.^ frf>\ - li-n-
Date Reoorted to BOi: /'/¥?/95 Tine Reported to BLM: r.-95Q ' 
Location: State: rrmH County: C JM-TULJJ j UT 
k£ 1/4 fl Z 1/4 Section "1 T. -2.3S ,
 R. !"}£, x/*tf?Meridian 
5 / ^ ^fMi^j Operator: __ ^ _ _ _ _ - , 
Surface Ownership:\FEDERAL^jINDIAN, PEE, STATE 
Lease Number: 7 Dhit Name of CA, Ntnnber 
type of Event: BLOWDOT, PIPE, FATALITY, INJURY, PPOPERIY DAMAGE,/OIL SPILL," 
SALTWATER SPILL, TDXIC FLUID SPILL, OIL AND SALTWATER SPILL, 
OIL AND TOXIC FLUID SPILL, SALTWATER AND TOXIC FLUID SPILL, 
GAS VENTING, OR OTHER (Specify) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Cause of Event: Lrt<* *£ r.iL TAK'K ti*£ FLth* ^ JS #I^*~LS O^±£ 
Volumes of Pollutants I. discharged or consumed: 
II. Recovered: -4*— 
Time Required to Control Event (in hours): $ l4lTb 
Action Taken to Control the Event, Description of Resultant Damage, 
Clean-up Procedures, and Dates: ^^/J/ICLI 5f„rfrl — ^Sf/x/df*-CJ&-cL~t/ 
^ y a*rfjL~ Jxm£Ar*iW aJtJ! TAU^^ ^JJ^ fa.u< j-^J^ 
Cause and Extent of Personnel Injury: A/jV-4^,, 
Other Federal, State, and Local Governmental Aqencies Notified: 
^ / w A t i ^ i ^ v ^ ^ 
Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: fo J^/^r { ^v h^zO 7udk*~' 
General Remarks: 
<^ /u*~ \ Xj*L J W T ^ V ^ ^:J U~ UiouJ a. 
Signature: 4 * „ Jfi s W w w * ^ Date: 95///A? •. 
f ft//*//y Title: u r . C , U 1f/'V*?Z 

TabF 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Heavy equipment Unit,P O Box 901540 Palrmiale. California 93590 
Date 1-12-96 Status Report 
Marine Office of America Corporation 
Bill Parker 
5690 DTC Boulevard 
EngJewood,Colorado 80111 
Claim # 54O6C3029 
InsuredsW. Energy 
Loss Date: 11-27-95 
—Awaiting insured response 
—Awaiting repair invoice 
—Awaiting repair estimate 
—Awaiting teardown of unit 
—Awaiting policy records 
—Awaiting additional bills 
—Awaiting response to settlement 
—made on 
OtherAwaitino requested report from Utah State Department of Land Management 
Comment: It appears tank floor weak due to age and composition of content Spoke with 
repair facility.wil! forward quote for refurbishing floor as needed. 
Upon receipt and further review of report,will advise on determination and course of 
action. 
If any questions or concerns, please contact this writer. 
JoeFerro 
Heavy Equipment Specialist 
(805) 272-8938 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Heavy Equipment Unit, P.O. Box 901540 Palmdale,California 93590 
February 6, 1996 
Marine Office of America Corporation 
William Parker 
5690 DTC Boulevard 
Englewood, Colorado 80111 
Claim # 540 6C 3029 
Insured: S.W. Energy 
Loss Date: 11-27-95 
Statement Summary 
As per Mr Will Lovato,at Double Tank Corporation,the floor of the 500 bbl tank with serial # 
2577 involved in this loss,was rotted,pitted and had a hole on the bottom toward the middle. 
The apparent cause is age and wear and tear.A quote was prepared to refurbish floor. 
Comment 
Statement was secured from Mr Lovato,president of Double Tank Corporation.Mr Lovato 
inspected this tank prior to our arrival as requested by our insured. 
l«o 
b-07-96 03:31P JOE FERRO 8GS-272-8938 
CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES 
Heavy Equipment UnitP.O. Box 901540 Palmdale, California 93590 
Facsimile Cover Sheet 
To: Bill Parker 
Company: MOAC 
Fax: 303-290-7349 




Pages including cover2 
Comments: COPY of report from Utah Land manaoement re: oil tank failure. 
F e b - 0 7 - 9 6 0 ^ : 3 2 P JOE FERRO 8 0 5 - 2 7 2 - 8 9 3 8 P . 0 2 
Subject: Report ovWesirable Event J 
Date o f Occurrence: /7 Ixnhf ^T Time of occurrence: £.r<U, frrt - //-»• >• 
Oat* Raoorted to BLM: ('klfot TJae^Reported to BLM: ^ ? r ' o 
Location: state: "TAB County: CJ^x^A 1/T 
1:6 1/4 5 cT 1/4 Section . ' 7 T. . 2 3~* , R. H £ , ____?Meridian 
Operator: , 
Surface Ownership:\FETCRALr)INDIAN, FEE, S*ME 
Lea^e Number: 'L{TUVbObo£ : Ohit ***» of C.A. »a«her 
Type Of Event: BLOWOUT, PIPE, FATALITY, LttfOHY, PROPERTY DAMAGE./on, SPJLL^ 
SALTWATER SPILL, TOXIC FLUlP SPTLL, OIL AND SALIWTER SPILL, 
OIL AND TOXIC FLUID SPILL, L^THATER AW TOXIC FLUID SPILL. 
GAS VENTING, OR OTHER (Specify) ________________________ 
Cau^ e of Event: Lffrr" fi£ r.iL T/K-K l{f£ Ft** *id fiufi*~U c ^^±C 
fy f,/H -J.c^ <l ^ MIL. r.L, y J ^ . . ^pc t l ^^^ ,^r7^ r.^fe,^ 
'VoltKKS, o l ?oV_ft_nta I . ^Vat'nargeA ox &****&, 4 £4- fifiLS 
I I . Recovered: 
Tijn« Required to Control Event (in hours): a l4u?*^ra~ 
Action Taken to Control the Event, Description of Resultant Damage, 
Cle*n-up Procedures, and Dates: l^/i/lll Skftl — RS/JX/dC-CJ&-CL~*S 
Cau$e and Extent of Personnel Iniury: 
Other Pederal, State, and Local Governmental Agencies Notif ied: 
General Remarks: 
+ rs-//2// y 
n. 
TabG 
Marine Oh.~e of America Corporation 
P.O. Box 17980 
Denver, CO 80217-0980 
(800) NSC - 2320 
Fax: (800) NSC - 2393 
February 8, 1996 
S.W. Energy Inc. 
847 E. 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84102 
Attn: Rich Smoot 
RE: Insured: 
Date of Loss: 
Our Claim No.: 
Our Policy No.: 
Your File No.: 
Subject: 
Dear Rich Smoot: 
We have investigated the above captioned oil tank seepage matter and regret to advise, that we will be 
unable to respond favorably to this matter. 
As you are aware, your Oil and Gas Lease Property Form policy proffers all risk coverage for your tanks, 
subject to various policy exclusions. Please review Section 5. This Policy Does Not Insure Against, 
subsection A., which stipulates 
" Loss or damage caused by ... wear and tear, gradual deterioration, corrosion ..." 
The repairer ( Double Tank Corporation) states in his report," The apparent cause is age and wear and 
tear." 
Due to the preceding, we must decline coverage for this matter in its totality. 
The foregoing declination of liability is not intended to be all inclusive and all other rights and defenses 
under the policy and / or law are hereby reserved to the company without specific enumeration. 
Should you have any further information that you believe will have any bearing on your claim, please 
contact me promptly so that we may discuss it further. 
Sincerely, 
William H. Parker 










Declination Of Claim 
TabH 
KAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER RECEIVE-
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW APR I 5 i^ 1-
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street W « H * P # N S C 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 -0385 kOQ 4 * | O A / 
Facsimile: ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 2 - 7 5 4 3 HTTl ' J , 7 7 0 
Telephone: ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 2 - 1 5 0 0 
Robert P. Hill Direct Line: (801) 323 -3334 
April 10, 1996 
Certified Mail - Return Receipt Requested 
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE 
MARINE OFFICE OF AMERICA CORPORATION 
P.O. Box 17980 
Denver Colorado 80217-0980 
Attn: Mr. William H. Parker 
Senior Claims Representative 
Re: S. W. Energy Corporation 
Policy No. IM 00488415 
Claim No. 540-6-C3029 
Gentlemen: 
We are writing on behalf of S. W. Energy Corporation, the 
insured under your policy No. IM 00488415 regarding a loss which 
occurred November 26, 1995. We have reviewed the underlying 
policy, your letter of February 8, 1996 addressed to Mr. Richard 
P. Smoot, President of S. W. Energy, and your facsimile letter of 
March 6, 1996 to Mr. Ken Osborne, your local broker, declining 
coverage. We have also made further investigation of the loss. 
Based on the foregoing, it has become clear that your initial 
denial of coverage is based on misunderstandings of the underly-
ing facts and on a misinterpretation of policy provisions under 
Utah law. We are writing to facilitate resolution of these 
misunderstandings and to expedite payment of the claim in order 
to avoid the need for further wasteful proceedings on the part of 
both parties. 
The underlying policy is a basic oil and gas lease property 
form, which covers both equipment and crude oil inventory at oil 
and gas wells operated by S. W. Energy Corporation in Grand 
County, Utah. 
The loss occurred on November 26, 1995 when a crude oil 
storage tank unexpectedly failed. The tank was full at the time, 
m 
Continental Insurance 
April 10, 1996 
Page 2 
holding 495-15 barrels of oil, all of which was dumped from the 
tank in a period of less than 90 minutes. The posted price for 
crude oil on the date of loss was $19.00 per barrel, for a total 
loss of $9,407.85 (less any applicable deductible). The accident 
was immediately reported to and investigated by the Bureau of 
Land Management, the lessor under the applicable oil and gas 
lease and owner of the land impacted by the lost crude oil. I 
have enclosed for your information a copy of the final report 
filed with and accepted by the B.L.M. which describes the acci-
dent. 
Following the failure of the tank, S. W. Energy determined 
that it would be more cost-effective to replace the failed tank 
with two smaller tanks than to repair it. The new tanks were 
ordered from CR Supply Company of Grand Junction Colorado. CR 
Supply, in turn, forwarded the order to Double Tank Corporation 
in Farmington, New Mexico, a distributor of new tanks. 
Double Tank delivered the new tanks in December, 1996. At 
the time the new tanks were delivered, Double Tank used its 
equipment to move the failed tank to a storage area and set up 
the new tanks. 
S. W. Energy has filed a claim under its oil and gas proper-
ty policy for the loss of the crude oil. It has made no claim 
for damage to or replacement of the failed tank. 
Your correspondence denying the claim reflects either a 
misunderstanding or a mischaracterization of the pertinent facts, 
policy provisions and claim. In your letter of February 8, you 
characterize the loss as "oil tank seepage," and decline "cover-
age for your tanks." In your facsimile of March 6, you charac-
terize the occurrence as "tank deterioration," and deny payment 
for "the leaked oil." 
S. W. Energy has not filed a claim for the damaged tank, but 
only for the lost oil. Thus, your initial analysis of the claim 
as a claim for damage to the tank was not only misplaced, it has 
apparently led to an incorrect analysis of the claim for lost 
oil. Furthermore, the loss did not occur due to "seepage" or 
"leaked oil." The subject tank and another identical tank at the 
same location have operated for years without any leakage or 
seepage. Both tanks are closely monitored by both by the opera-
tor and the Bureau of Land Management. There was no evidence of 
leakage in the subject tank prior to the failure, and the identi-
cal tank continues in use without any evidence of deterioration 
or failure. The loss which occurred on November 2 6 was caused by 
the sudden and unexpected failure of the tank — not by seepage 
or leaks due to deterioration. 
\X5 
Continental Insurance 
April 10, 1996 
Page 3 
In your letter of February 8 you also state: 
The repairer (Double Tank Corporation) states 
in his report, "The apparent cause is age and 
wear and tear." 
This comment is difficult to reconcile for two reasons. 
First, S. W. Energy has not made a claim for the tank. Second, 
and more importantly, there is no foundation for any "report" by 
Double Tank Corporation. Double Tank did not "repair" the tank 
and did not even examine the tank or investigate its failure. 
Double Tank is merely a distributor of new tanks. Its delivery 
crew simply moved the failed tank to a storage area and delivered 
two new tanks. Double Tank was not retained to investigate or 
examine the tanks, and it is doubtful that the Double Tank 
delivery crew would have been competent to investigate the 
condition of the old tanks in any event, even if they had been 
asked to conduct such an investigation. Furthermore, as a 
distributor of new tanks, Double Tank has an inherent conflict of 
interest with respect to any opinion regarding existing tanks.1 
Any comment which may have been made by an employee of Double 
Tank regarding the failed tank would be mere speculation at best. 
It is certainly not a "report" based on investigation by an 
impartial, competent "repairer." 
As the adjuster should have observed when he examined the 
tank himself, there is no evidence of rust, deterioration or 
corrosion near the point of failure in the subject tank. In 
fact, because the primary component of the crude oil produced in 
this field is paraffin, the subject tank was thoroughly coated by 
paraffin on the inside as a result of usage, and was specially 
treated by the manufacturer on the outside, effectively prevent-
ing corrosion. The protective paraffin layer had to be removed 
by steam-cleaning in order even to evaluate the tank's condition 
following its failure. 
In addition to the fact that the tank failure was not caused 
by corrosion or wear and tear in the first place, your reliance 
on the corrosion exclusion of the policy reflects an even more 
fundamental error in the original analysis of the claim under the 
plain language of the policy. 
Double Tank's purported comments may be more easily understood in light 
of the fact that Double Tank attempted to collect substantial overcharges for 
the new tanks above the agreed contract price and threatened punitive action 
against S. W. Energy if it did not pay the excess claim, even further under-
mining Double Tank's impartiality and credibility. 
Continental Insurance 
April 10, 1996 
Page 4 
The policy covers both equipment and crude oil. It insures 
against "direct physical loss of or damage to" the covered 
property. Paragraph 5A, upon which you erroneously relied in 
refusing coverage, excludes "loss or damage caused by" wear and 
tear, corrosion, rust, etc. 
If, and only if, (i) the policy had covered only the tanks 
(and not the oil itself), (ii) the tank failure had been caused 
by corrosion, and (iii) S. W. Energy had filed a claim for damage 
to the tank, then the position which you have taken might have 
been justified. In that event the "direct physical damage" would 
have been the damage to the tank caused by the corrosion. In 
that scenario, the loss of the oil would have been an indirect 
physical loss, and might not have been covered. 
In actual fact, the oil is separately covered by the insur-
ance policy, in addition to the tanks and equipment. The oil did 
not rust, corrode or wear out. The "direct physical loss" was 
the dumping of the oil onto the ground, which was caused by the 
sudden and unexpected failure of the tank. Even if there had 
been corrosion, the corrosion would only have been indirectly 
related to the physical loss of the oil, and the policy exclusion 
would not have applied in any event. An insurer could as easily 
argue that there would be no coverage for lost oil if a truck 
crashed into a storage tank because of rusty brakes or a worn out 
steering wheel. 
In Utah, insurance policies are not construed according to 
hypertechnical interpretations designed to nullify the very 
coverage for which the insured paid premiums, but are given the 
plain meaning which an insured layman would assign under the 
circumstances. Even if there had been an ambiguity in the clear 
policy language., the Utah courts would resolve that ambiguity in 
favor of the insured. In any event, in view of the plain lan-
guage of this policy, there is simply no good faith basis to deny 
coverage for the lost oil in this case. 
To summarize then, S. W. Energy Corporation is entitled to 
coverage for the lost crude oil. The crude oil did not rust, 
corrode or wear out in normal usage. It was lost through a 
sudden and unexpected failure of a storage tank. There is no 
evidence of corrosion or wear and tear with respect to the tank, 
and even if corrosion had indirectly contributed to the accident, 
the corrosion exclusion still would not have prevented coverage 
for the direct physical loss of the oil. 
We would appreciate your reviewing the claim in light of the 
correct facts and applicable policy provisions, and then reim-
In 
Continental Insurance 
April 10, 1996 
Page 5 
bursing S. W. Energy for the lost oil within 15 days following 
your receipt of this letter. 
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance. If you have 
any questions, or if you would like to discuss the matter fur-
ther, please do not hesitate to call. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Robert P. Hill 
RPH/hmm 
cc: Mr. Richard P. Smoot 




G A R R E T T 
ENGINEERS, INC. P R E P A R E D F O R 
MR. JOE FERRO 
CNA INSURANCE 
3137 EAST AVENUE Q-15 
PALMDALE, CALIFORNIA 93550 
CONCERNING 
S & W ENERGY TANK FADLURE 
OUR CASE NO. 0596TO15439 
RECEIVED 
JUN 0 5 19S6 
NSC 
FORENSIC DIVISION • 2662 E. Del AmoBlvd, Carson, CA 90221 • P.O. Box 91659, Long Beach, CA 90809-1659 • (800)229-3647 • (310)537-3647 • FAX (310) 537-1933 
G A R R E T T 
ENGIN E E f l S , INC . 
P H O T O G R A P H 
(1 Photograph) 
ho 
G A R R E T T 
E N G I N E E R S , I N C . May 28, 1996 
Mr. Joe Ferro 
CNA INSURAiNCE 
3137 East Avenue Q-15 
Palmdale, California 93550 
Re: S & W ENERGY TANK FAILURE 
Date of Loss: 11-17-95 
Your Insured: Richard Smoot DBA S & W Energy 
Claim No.: 5406C3029 
Our Case No.: 0596TO15439 
Dear Mr. Ferro: 
ASSIGNMENT: 
GARRETT ENGINEERS, INC. was assigned to determine the cause and origin of the failed oil 
holding tank, allowing the contents to leak. 
CONCLUSIONS; 
The following observations were made: 
There was no fitting failure; all fitting connections were in good condition. 
The tank was fabricated in 1963. Inside of the tank, centered on the bottom, is a small pipe 
support frame to support the recirculating lines. 
FORENSIC DIVISION • 2662 E. Del Amo Blvd., Carson, CA 90221 • P.O. Box 91659, Long Beach, CA 90809-1659 • (800)229-3647 • (310)537-3647 ' FAX (310) 537-1933 
A R B E T T 
EMQ,NEERS ,NC
 Re: S & WEnergy Tank Failure - 2 
Each leg of the frame was welded to the tank bottom. It appears that the original frame to tank 
welds did not pass inspection; and at least two of the welds were repaired. 
Along the side of the welded connection that was completely rusted away was a hole 
approximately 2 inches wide. This was the source of the oil spill (see Sketch #4) and the 
attached photo). 
DISCUSSION: 
I made arrangements with Joe Ferro of CNA Insurance and Richard Smoot of S & W Energy 
to visit the oil field where the failed tank is located. 
I met with Jim Pinneo of S & W Energy at the site on May 5, 1996. 
The primary structural plate welds, both externally and internally, were in good condition and 
were well made. No primary structural damage of any kind was visible. 
Inside of the tank, centered on the bottom, is a small pipe support frame (see Sketch #1). The 
purpose of the support frame is to support the recirculating lines (usually 4 to 6 lines each, 
approximately 3/4 to 1 inch nominal pipe). 
G A R R E T T 
E N G I N E E R , I N C . Re: s & WEnergy Tank Failure - 3 
Each leg of the frame was welded to the tank bottom (see Sketch #2). These welds were not 
of the same quality as those of the primary structure. One fillet was poorly made, and two were 
applied by a different welding method. The fourth was completely rusted away. 
From these welds, I am led to believe that the support frame was added after the tank was 
fabricated. Also, it appears that the original frame to tank welds did not pass inspection; and 
at least two of the welds were repaired. 
Along the side of the welded connection that was completely rusted away was a hole 
approximately 2 inches wide (see Sketch #4) and the attached photo. This was the source of the 
oil spill. 
The 2 inch hole had rusted from the outside. It rusted from the outside in because of a common 
error made during field fabrications. 
When the support frame was welded to the thin 1/4 inch bottom plate, a heat affected zone 
around the welded area was created (see Sketch #3). Experience has taught us that without 
proper protective measures, the metal in the heat affected zone rusts at a faster rate than metal 
that has not been affected by high welding temperatures. 
After the support frame was welded to the tank bottom, the tank bottom should have been 
cleaned (power tool or sand blast) and protected with a coat of primer and a coat of paint. 
i . 
G A R R E T T 
E N G I N E E R S , INC Re: S & WEnergy Tank Failure - 4 
However, elevating a storage tank of this size and taking protective measures are time 
consuming, expensive task that many fabricators choose not to perform. 
The end user of the tank would not have known that the tank, as a whole unit, was not properly 
fabricated. Ordinary visual inspections would not have shown the existence of a problem. 
Everyone involved in this matter should be reminded that the tank did last for thirty-three years. 
Thank you for calling GARRETT ENGINEERS, INC. If you have any questions regarding this 
report, or if you need any further assistance, please contact our office. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARRETT ENGINEERS, INC. 
Roger Phillips, P.E. 
Mechanical Engineer 
RP:hm 
Enclosures: 1 Photograph 
Sketches #1, #2, #3, and #4) 
iw 
G A R R E T T 




G A R R E T T 
ENGIN E E f l S , INC . 
S K E T C H E S 
(4 Sketches) 
IH<* 
SMALL PIPE SUPPORT FRAME 
APPRDX 16' SQUARE X 6' HIGH 
CONSTRUCTED DF 1 1/2' X 1 1/2' ANGLES 
WELDED DN CENTER DF TANK BDTTDM 
T A N K 
C 1 5 ' - 6 ' H X 1 6 ' D I A > 
VERTICAL SECTIDN 
THRU TANK 
TANK FABRICATED BY AMERICAN STEEL TANK CDRP - MARCH, 1963. 
OWNED BY s&W ENERGY CO. 
LDCATED IN THE STATE OF UTAH - APPRDX 10 MILES FROM THE 
EXIT #173 ON INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 170, 
SKETCH ttl 
EACH LEG WAS WELDED TD THE TANK BQTTDM 
WITH A FILLET WELD ALDNG THE OUTSIDE EDGES 
HDRIZDNTAL SECTIDN 




THRU SUPPDRT LEGS 
VIEW B 
HEAT AFFECTED ZONE 
THRU TANK BDTTDM 
PLATE WQULD BE A 







THRU SUPPORT LEGS 
VIEW C 
TANK BDTTDM HAD A HDLE 
APPRDX 2' ACCRDSS 
LDCATED ARQUND DNE DF 
THE PIPE SUPPDRT LEGS 
APPRDX AS SHOWN 
TANK BDTTDM RUSTED FROM 
THE DUTSIDE IN ALONG 
THE PATH DF THE WELD 
SKETCH t+4 
Tab J 
SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 3 63-7 611 
FILED D!?TS!CT COURT 
Thir Tistrict 
OCT 0 1 1997 
SAL; L A ^ ^ ^ ^ 7 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
and MARINE OFFICE OF AMERICA 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Civil No. 960905357 
Judge William A. Thorne 
Plaintiff's and defendants, cross motions for summary 
judgment having come before the court on Monday, June 23, 1997, 
John A. Adams appearing on behalf of S.W. Energy Corporation, and 
Scott W. Christensen appearing on behalf of Continental Insurance 
Company and Marine Office of American Corporation ("MOAC") . The 
court, having reviewed the pleadings and motions on file, having 
heard oral argument of counsel and being fully advised in the 
premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order: 
TXt 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The hole in the tank in which the oil was being 
stored was caused by rust. 
2. The oil was lost because of the hole in the tank. 
3. The oil itself was not rusted or corroded. However, 
since the hole in the tank was caused by rust or corrosion, the 
loss of the oil was also caused by rust or corrosion. 
4. The decision by MOAC to deny coverage was the result 
of a reasonable reading of the language of the exclusion. 
5. MOAC denied coverage in a timely fashion. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. When the language of a policy of insurance is 
susceptible to two or more plausible interpretations, the language 
is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of coverage to the 
insured. 
2. The language in the MOAC policy of insurance 
covering exclusions from coverage contained only one plausible 
interpretation and therefore is clear and unambiguous. 
3. The loss of the oil was caused by rust or corrosion 
within the meaning of the exclusion from coverage in the insurance 
policy. 
2 
4. Based upon the clear language of the contract, 
defendant MOAC properly denied coverage for the claim for lost oil 
presented by S.W. Energy. 
5. S.W. Energy's motion for summary judgment is denied. 
6. Because MOAC's denial of coverage was proper and 
timely, MOAC is not subject to any claim for bad faith, fraudulent 
insurance acts, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty or punitive 
damages. 
7. An insurer does not violate its obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing to an insured by denying coverage when an 
insured claims a different interpretation of the insurance policy 
so long as the insurer has no bad motive in denying coverage. 
8. MOAC's cross motion for summary judgment is granted. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on all claims is granted. 
DATED this S* day of ^ upLuiabui, 1997. 
BY THE COURTi'V\ 
WILLIAM A. -THBfttaB
 / 
DISTRICT COURT^OUDGE ' 
£? 
"LI? 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
fr^H,. tf. Cidt 
OHN A. ADAMS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
245908.01/JM 
"U°i 
